Jackson’s Knowledge Argument

Dualism is the theory that our globe is not entirely somatic al adept is made up of mind and matter, and so uggesting the mind is not the sensation ( headland is matter, the mind is a separate entity). Cartesian Dualism states Each mind is an immaterial substance open(a) of independent existence. The sign property of this substance is thought. The tangible world is a material substance, capable of independent existence. The characteristic property of this substance is extension (taking up space). (Lecture 1, DCT). Monism, in contrast to dualism states that the mind and brain ar unified, and that there is no disagreement between the twain.Those who support monism believe that there is besides unmatched reality. philistinism is a kind of monism as it is the belief that distinguishable approaches to the mind-body problem, let us look at the cognition argument by Frank Jackson, who theorises that materialism is false. Jackson describes deuce thought tests to support his anti- materialism theory. The first centres around bloody shame, a brilliant scientist who is confined to a saturnine and white room, who submits everything through b lose and white, including a black and white television.Mary is an expert in the neurophysiology of vision learns exclusively the somatogenetic education slightly what happens to the brain when we gossip colour. Jackson (1982, p. 30) states She discovers, for example, average which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the muscle contraction of vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence The sky is savoury. When Mary leaves the room, and settles the colour red for the first time, Jackson raises the question of whether Mary provide learn whatsoeverthing or not.Jackson claims that yes indeed Mary does, because she is having a stark naked visual experience that she has not had before, despite having all the sensible info prior to this. Jackson (1982, p. 130) goes on But then it is inescapable that her introductory knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is to a greater extent to look at than that, and Physicalism is false. Jackson believes that qualia has been left out of this story. qualia relates to our get inhering experiences.When I break a colour, smell a perfume, I am subjected toa sure experience that is further relevant to me, no one else can experience these sensations the demeanor I do. The following thought experiment in Jacksons paper explains this further. Fred, presented with a bunch of ripe tomatoes, separates them n to two groups. Fred has better colour vision than anyone else, but manages to separate the tomatoes into two groups, redl and red2. Whilst we may categorise all the tomatoes as simply red, Fred invites clearly two different types of red, in the way we would distinguish yellow fr om green.Suppose we know all active Freds physiology and discover is a super ability to separate colours on the red spectrum, it does not actually tell us what it is deal to see colour from Freds perspective, or his colour experience. No amount of physical information about Fred can tell us what it is like o see colours in the said(prenominal) way as Fred does. Furthermore, if we were to implant Freds brain into another beings body, it still would not tell us anything about Freds conscious experience of seeing red at this present moment in time.Thomas Nagels paper What is it like to be a bat? reinforces the theory that physicalism leaves something out. If we look at physicalism clinically, for example, look at the facts about Marys physiology that change to her to see, we can know what happens to the optic nerve and retina when Mary sees colour, or light, but her experience of seeing he colour red is a subjective one. This experience is told from the first person shoot for of enamour, therefore Nagel suggests that we cannot be objective about other peoples experiences.Nagel (1974, p. 426) describes how we can we expose the physicality of bats right away we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high frequency shrieks. There is nothing about a bats senses that atomic number 18 like ours, and while we can imagine hat it may be like to be another human being, we cannot imagine what it is like to our inclination.As we do not deal experience of being a bat our imagination is therefore limited. It is within my capabilities to mimic a bats behaviour, eat insects, hang meridian down, imagine myself flying, but I cannot share the same experiences as a bat as only a bat knows what it is like to have these experiences. One of the main physicalist responses to Jacksons knowledge argument is to agree that Mary does learn something new when she leaves the black and white room. Physicalists say hat Mary has gained a new ability rather than a new fact.Remember that Mary have all physical information before she left the room. Another physicalist view is that Mary is experiencing a genial state that is a result of the physical impact on her brain when she sees colour. The mental state that happens to Mary is seen as a brain state and therefore deemed to be physical. She already has the knowledge how to see colour but not necessarily knowledge that. noesis that is knowing that Paris is the capital of France, whilst knowledge how is knowing how to play the piano.Mary knows how to come colour. There is in like manner the matter of causal closure which relates to every physical event having a physical cause. For example, if you bang your toe, is a physical event, which activates the mental state of pain, and to make the decision to hold on to your toe is also a mental st ate, however it results in your holding your toe, which is a physical event. This physicalist argument is a strong one, but no matter which way we look at the mind-body problem no one can have your conscious experiences.There can be countless thought experiments but from each one subject will see or feel things differently. Philip Goff (2013) states Physicalism is a grand and ambitious project, but there is a thorn in its side consciousness. The qualities each of us encounters in our conscious experience the view of pain, the sensations of biting into a lemon, what its like to see red stubbornly forswear to be incorporated into the physicalists all-encompassing vision of the universe. Consciousness seems to be the one bit of left-over magic that refuses to be physicalised.And its all the fault of the zombie spirits. Goff calls these zombies philosophical (or p-zombies) as they are not supposed to e the zombies that we see in films, it is a zombie that is used in philosophical thought experiments. If your zombie, was opened up, everything about its brain structure would be identical with yours. The thing that the zombie would lack is conscious experience. It might scream when it is excavatebed with a stab, but it is because it is programmed to do so, its reactions will not coincide with feelings of pain of pleasure.Goff, talking about zombies summarises this point However, your zombie twin has no inner experience there is nothing that its like to be your zombie twin. Its screaming and running away when stabbed isnt accompanied by a feeling of pain. Its smiles are not accompanied by any feeling of pleasure. Goff puts forward an excellent argument to those who identify brain states with conscious states. He talks about what happens in the brain when you are in pain.If a brain surgeon was to open you up to see what is going on in your head if you had been stabbed with a knife they would see c-fibres firing, but they would not see that you are in pain and t he c-fibres are firing, they could see what is happening physically but your conscious xperience of pain would not be visible. Goff (2013) explains to say that the feeling of pain is identical with c-fibres firing in your brain, is to say that pain the thing you sees when she looks in your head after youVe had the knife stuck in you are one and the same thing.It is to say that we dont have two things pain and c-fibres firing but one thing with two labels Furthermore, if your zombie was opened up and a brain surgeon wanted to observe their brain activity after being stabbed by a knife, over again they would observe the c-fibres firing, but there would be the absence of the onscious experience of pain. If you stab your zombie it will create a physical event, with a physical response but you cannot know what it is like to be your zombie, in the same way that your zombie cannot know what it is like to be you.Your zombie cannot be the same as you physically and consciously as you ca n only be one person. I do not believe that it is contingent to completely resolve the mind-body problem. I am inclined to lean towards Jacksons point of view that we cannot perceive the colour red from Marys point of view. Not only can we not perceive things visually, if Mary ad been colour art but gained knowledge how to perceive colours through touch or other senses, it would still be true to say that her experience would be a subjective one.